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Book Reviews
From Parameters, Autumn 2001, pp. 164-81.
The Culture of Defense. By Christopher D. Van Aller. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001. 208 pages.
$65.00. Reviewed by Charles Moskos, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University.
What should be the direction of our armed forces? And what should be done to move the armed forces in that
direction? These are the questions Christopher Van Aller raises and persuasively answers. The core thesis of this
elegantly written and reasoned book is that national leaders and citizens need to examine the political and sociological
characteristics of armed forces before they embark on military change, whether in technology or people. The need, in
the title of the book, is to grasp the culture of defense.
The guiding principle in the analysis is the inherent friction between the military and civilian worlds. This friction is
manifest, in somewhat oversimplified terms, in those who believe only high expenditures guarantee security and those
who consider military programs basically as a waste of a society's wealth. But this friction can be complementary, Van
Aller argues. Modern warfare, as well as operations other than war, requires the talents of both civilian and military
worlds. The issue is the right ratio between the two spheres.
If the military should resist most of the organizational practices common to civilian organizations (e.g. frequent
personnel turnover), the armed forces need the periodical infusion of civilian energy and creativity (e.g. breaking out
of old modes of warfighting). Inasmuch as war or its threat is a recurring condition, it behooves us to understand what
sort of soldiers it takes to win wars. We also need to understand how to avoid having these soldiers become a threat to
the civil society. Van Aller sees the United States entering the 21st century as a country founded on principles inimical
to peacetime service and martial values. Yet, it is, at the same time, the preeminent military power with global
commitments.
Today as in much of America's military history, two key problems exist. One is the fascination with technology, to the
detriment of understanding morale and initiative. This "technism" is particularly evident in the curriculum of the
service academies. "West Point and Annapolis still emphasize mathematics and technology to the detriment of history
and strategy." In a very provocative point, Van Aller states that American security planners ought to consider, though
not necessarily adopt, less costly weapon systems rather than always planning for changes of greater technological
complexity.
The other recurring problem is the avoidance of military service by privileged youth during peacetime and combat duty
during wars. This in turn disconnects the armed forces from civilian elites, a state of affairs Van Aller sees as an
increasing gap in the post-Cold War era. In fact, the overemphasis on weapon technology in defense planning leads to
an avoidance of dealing with more decisive issues, such as who should serve.
Van Aller casts a wide historical and philosophical net, invoking the insights of Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von
Clausewitz, and Alexis de Tocqueville. He adapts the theories of these political theorists to lay the groundwork for an
updated notion of citizenship obligation and civil-military relations. Among modern theorists, the author frequently
cites Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Edward Luttwak, and Martin van Creveld (whose name unfortunately is
misspelled in the text). A reference to some of the contemporary iconoclasts such as Ralph Peters or Charles Dunlap
could have strengthened Van Aller's presentation.
Van Aller makes a highly original argument that the initial phases of most major American military conflicts are
usually hamstrung by the existing military professional leadership, but rescued by outside civilian direction. He
convincingly argues that such changes rarely come from within the military establishment itself. One example is how
civilian leadership implemented the convoy system over the resistance of the naval leadership in both world wars.

Now more than ever, it is necessary to redesign forces for the threats of the contemporary post-Cold War period. Since
the Cold War ended a decade ago, the Pentagon has built its force structure around the notion that the United States
must be able to fight and win two major regional wars almost simultaneously to meet its global national security
obligations. That the Defense Department review concluded by Secretary Rumsfeld has now recommended that the
two-war scenario be scrapped in favor of a more complex approach buttresses Van Aller's thesis. Noteworthy, this
significant change in security premises was a key recommendation of the early 2001 report of the US Commission on
National Security/21st Century, headed by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman.
Van Aller makes a strong case for the contemporary relevance of the citizen-soldier concept. He would like to see a
reinvigoration of the citizen-soldier, coupled with a solid professional officer corps. He argues for serious
consideration of a compulsory form of national service for American youth, including civilian as well as military
service. (Full disclosure: your reviewer is cited heavily in this regard.)
The Culture of Defense raises important and troubling questions. Van Aller's answers are persuasive as he attempts to
reconcile notions of citizenship obligation with the realities of the post-Cold War era. The author performs an
important service in casting a skeptical light on the traditional military profession and its unbridled faith in technology.
The publication of this book is exceptionally well-timed.
The Tiananmen Papers. Compiled by Zhang Liang. Edited by Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link. New York:
Public Affairs, 2001. 513 pp. $30.00. Reviewed by Dr. Andrew Scobell, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College.
This volume is one of the most hyped books of the year, having been front-page news in major newspapers and
excerpted in Foreign Affairs. The compiler and editors pitch the book as a compendium of secret Chinese documents
that provides a behind-the-scenes look at the deliberations of China's top leaders during the spring of 1989. Of course,
the backdrop to these high-level meetings in Beijing that readers are now privy to is the unprecedented, massive,
spontaneous, and remarkably peaceful demonstrations in cities all across China. The focus of most interest is on what
the volume reveals about the decision to use lethal force against Chinese civilians in Beijing on the weekend of 3-4
June 1989.
Controversy has surrounded the publication of The Tiananmen Papers. Major questions have been raised about the
authenticity of the documents. Many of the documents appear to be genuine; others, such as the "memoranda of
conversations supplied by a friend of Yang Shangkun who cannot be further identified," are more suspect. While the
information and picture presented are consistent with those we already possess, this does not necessarily make The
Tiananmen Papers genuine. If the documents are forgeries, they are very good ones. The individual who spirited
computer printouts of the documents out of China and selected the items to be included from a larger collection in his
possession appears to be well-connected. He clearly has a pro-reform agenda. As he explains in the preface, it is the
belief that publishing the documents will "make a fundamental contribution to building democratic government in
China" which motivated him to make the material available to foreign audiences (a Chinese edition has since been
published, although it is banned in China).
What is the significance of the documents? They contain no startling revelations. Readers actually learn little that is
new about the events of 1989. Instead, readers receive confirmation of widely assumed details. Indeed, according to
The Tiananmen Papers, Deng Xiaoping and his cabal of octogenarian comrades were literally "calling the shots." And
blame from this group for encouraging the demonstrations fell squarely on the shoulders of Communist Party
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who advocated a conciliatory approach to the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and
disappeared from view after martial law was declared in mid-May. Also confirmed was the key role of Deng and the
elders in selecting Zhao's replacement: Jiang Zemin. He was the consensus candidate because he was untainted by the
crackdown in Beijing. Jiang fit the bill because during the spring of 1989 he was the Party Secretary in Shanghai
where he handled the protests adeptly and without violence. Equally significant in Deng's eyes--as The Tiananmen
Papers makes clear--was that Jiang was widely recognized in China as pro-reform. His selection therefore was to
serve as a clear signal that despite the bloody suppression, economic reform remained the country's top priority. In
short, the real value of the volume is the additional detail and vividness we get regarding elite dynamics at a time of

great turmoil in China.
In doing so, the book also provides fascinating glimpses of the crisis management behavior of Beijing's elite. Many of
these observations remain highly pertinent as China enters the first decade of the 21st century. The system today
continues to rely on consensus decisionmaking to function smoothly. It is when this elite consensus breaks down that
the party-state can become immobilized. This is even truer today than it was in 1989. Then Deng Xiaoping was the
paramount leader who, although needing to persuade his contemporaries, was clearly the unchallenged top
decisionmaker in China. Today, with Deng and virtually the entire Long March generation gone from the scene, there
is no single leader of Deng's stature who wields the same kind of power or prestige. Jiang Zemin (and whoever
succeeds him as paramount leader) is much more of a "first among equals" and must constantly cut deals with his
comrades on the Politburo to get things accomplished. The result is a leadership system that can be paralyzed during
times of crisis.
One of the most surprising images gleaned from this volume is how marginalized or acquiescent almost all uniformed
and retired military leaders appear to have been during the deliberations on how to respond to the demonstrations of
1989. While seemingly peripheral at the policymaking level, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was of course
centrally involved in the implementation phase--enforcing martial law in Beijing in late May and in the bloodletting of
early June. Although the PLA leadership was initially reluctant to be deployed in Beijing against Han Chinese
civilians, in the final analysis with one notable exception they loyally obeyed Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the Central
Military Commission. The lesson of Tiananmen for the PLA is a greater hesitancy to play the role of regime enforcer.
The lesson for the party is not to rely on the PLA as the first line of defense against domestic upheaval. As a result,
during the 1990s China's leaders have sought to make the paramilitary People's Armed Police more capable of serving
as the first responders in major cases of protest or civil unrest.
The Tiananmen Papers contains useful maps of Beijing and the area around Tiananmen Square, helpful explanatory
and introductory notes, and brief biographies of the major players. Moreover, Andrew Nathan and Orville Schell, two
of the most respected and prolific US scholars of contemporary China, provide valuable and frank evaluations of the
documents in the introduction and afterword. Their assessment is that the documents seem to be authentic, but they
cannot be 100-percent sure. Anyone interested in contemporary China must read this book. And each reader must draw
his or her own conclusions about whether the papers ring true. While The Tiananmen Papers cannot be regarded as the
complete or definitive account of the events of 1989, it is likely to be the best we can do until Chinese archives are
opened to scholars.
Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. By Michael I. Handel. 3d ed.; Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001.
482 pages. $24.95. Reviewed by Dr. David Jablonsky (Colonel, USA Ret.) Professor of National Security Affairs,
US Army War College.
Michael Handel's Masters of War is a work of stunning originality and intellectual depth. This third edition was
published shortly before the author's untimely death earlier this year. The centerpiece of the book is a comparison of
Carl von Clausewitz's On War with Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Using these two works, Handel convincingly
demonstrates that there is no unique eastern or western approach to the art of war--that in fact the basic logic of
strategy is universal, involving political direction and the correlation of ends and means. War, in short, is complex and
reciprocal in nature; involves moral or nonrational dimensions; and must always deal with friction, uncertainty,
chance, and luck. But in the study of the classical works on strategy, to paraphrase Clausewitz, "the result is never
final." Handel understood this and in this edition added new chapters and expanded discussion on other classical
theorists ranging from Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Antoine-Henri de Jomini to Julian Corbett and Mao Tsetung. The result is a dynamic, nuanced, and sophisticated examination of classical strategic thought with direct
application to the strategic issues of today.
To aid the reader in this intellectual smorgasbord, Dr. Handel includes six appendices, five pullout maps and charts, 29
figures, and six tables. He also provides extensive footnotes, many of them miniature essays that alone are worth the
price of admission. Equally important, Handel uses quotes from "the masters" throughout the book to great effect in
illustrating differences and similarities. And in addition to the normal general reference index, he provides an index

that captures the key concepts of the classical theorists. This is an invaluable help in pulling together thoughts of the
strategists that are not always assembled together in their works. On War, for example, has no chapter on war
termination. But Clausewitz does address this important concept throughout the book in a diffuse manner--all captured
in Handel's special index as well as in a separate chapter on the subject.
Another such concept is levels of analysis, which Professor Handel uses to make important distinctions between the
two principal philosophers of war. Sun Tzu's framework is broader than that of Clausewitz, whose treatise is focused
for the most part at the operational level on the art of waging war--at that point, in other words, when diplomacy has
failed. For the Chinese theorists, as Handel illustrates in both a separate chapter and an appendix, political, diplomatic,
and logistical preparation for war, as well as the actual fighting, are all considered part of the same activity at the
strategic level of analysis. All this in turn leads to a rich discussion with examples ranging from the Gulf War to
Kosovo of what Handel calls the "tacticization of strategy"--the operational or military tail wagging the politicalstrategic dog.
Such differences, Handel emphasizes, are intertwined with many more similarities and complementary ideas. For
instance, in two important chapters concerned with the rational calculus of war, he demonstrates that both Sun Tzu and
Clausewitz were aware of the crucial effect on that calculus of intangible, nonquantifiable "moral factors" that could
include the personality, experience, and intuition of leaders; the passions and characteristics of the people; and the
training and motivation of the military. Of the two, Sun Tzu is the more optimistic that rational calculation can still
bring about intended results. For Clausewitz, too, war is a rational instrument for leaders to promote and protect a
state's interest. But he did not consider it possible for war itself--permeated as it is by "moral factors"--to be waged as
a rational activity. All this, as Handel outlines in marvelous detail, has important implications for today's military
organizations, which are often so preoccupied with the material and technological aspects of war that they tend to
overlook its "moral" dimensions. The current milieu of "information war," "cyber war," and "revolution in military
affairs" often suggests that war has been transformed into a rational activity based on nearly perfect information. If
anything, Handel concludes in typically succinct and elegant prose, the role of moral factors has expanded, and "war is
and will remain a relentlessly reciprocal activity in which all participants can counter each other with different
methods, weapons, and technologies."
The key to this approach is to understand the nature of war--the supreme act of judgment. For this task, Professor
Handel illustrates why Clausewitz has no peer among classical war theorists in establishing a conceptual framework.
At the heart of that framework is the analysis of the three dominant tendencies of violence (the people), chance (the
military), and reason (the government) that make up what Clausewitz termed the Remarkable Trinity. Beginning with
this analysis, Clausewitz provided all the elements necessary for the conceptual structure, but never fully articulated
the framework. Handel believes this is fortunate since that very lack of articulation forces each reader to develop an
individual structure for the Clausewitzian system--to interpret in different holistic ways the interactions, connections,
and relative significance of the various concepts, each of which if considered separately causes the total of On War to
appear to be less than the sum of its parts. To illustrate this approach, Handel devotes an entire appendix to the
examination of Clausewitz's work as a complex system of interrelated concepts. At the same time, using two flow
charts to summarize the Prussian theorist's systematic study of war in a simplified visual manner, Handel sorts out
many of the issues and provides a heuristic stimulus for further discussion.
In all this, Dr. Handel applies with great effect the strategic theories of the past to the modern practice of war. Toward
the end of the book, for example, he returns to Clausewitz's ideal type of war to discuss the principle of continuity and
the concept of war termination. The principle of continuity involves maintaining unrelenting pressure on the enemy--an
ideal type of escalation to nonstop war. In reality, as Clausewitz demonstrated, war involves a great deal of inactivity,
inaction, and interruption because of such variables as inadequate information and the intensity of motives involved.
To this, Handel adds insightful examples of how continuity or the lack thereof in operational campaigns can affect the
termination of war. The refusal of the allies in the fall of 1918 to stop their advance while negotiating an armistice with
Germany, he pointed out, is in sharp contrast to the adverse results after the cessation of the United Nations ground
offensive in Korea in June 1951 as soon as the enemy indicated a readiness to negotiate. At the same time, Handel
discusses why the principle of continuity is in tension with Clausewitz's concept of the culminating point of the attack-the idea that as any attack continues to advance and succeed, it also diminishes in strength. The discussion is aided by
pull-out color diagrams, one of which includes the 1940-43 British-German "see-saw" situations in the Western Desert

when both sides pressed their attacks beyond the culminating point. It was Rommel, with his inclination to take risks,
who favored the principle of continuity over the identification of the culminating point.
It is this technique that makes every chapter so compelling, whether it is a comparison of perspectives of the classical
theorists on deception, surprise, and intelligence or an in-depth discussion of the "Weinberger Doctrine" for the use of
military force in terms of Clausewitz's warning "not to take the first step without considering the last." In the end, what
emerges from Dr. Handel's analysis is an overall conceptual continuity in the outlook of the classical theorists to war
and strategy. In particular, as Handel repeatedly demonstrates, On War and The Art of War do not involve antagonistic
theories. Both works transcend the limitations of time and space as well as cultural, historical, and linguistic
differences. Each work complements the other, and each is equally relevant for the modern student. And both, as Dr.
Handel reminds the reader throughout this movable intellectual feast, "remain the greatest and most original studies
ever written on war."
Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. By A. J. Langguth. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. 766 pages.
$35.00. Reviewed by Dr. Lewis Sorley, author of A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of
America's Last Years in Vietnam.
The reader is not left wondering about the path this account is going to take. Indeed, the jacket copy reveals all: An
admiring quotation from a North Vietnamese suggesting the inevitability of the war's outcome; deprecatory comments
on the "ineptness and corruption" of the South Vietnamese and the "waffling and self-deceived" White Houses of
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon; and references to the "enemy's unbroken will and America's fatal
miscalculations." While one might credit the author's claim to a "broad sweep," the companion assertion of "evenhanded" is impossible to accept.
Next, still before the main text, comes confirmation in the author's "Cast of Characters." Americans listed number 58,
including Elbridge Durbrow, Leslie Gelb, even Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who died in 1945. But not Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker, who served for six years at the head of the American Embassy in Saigon. And not General
Creighton Abrams, who commanded American forces in Vietnam for four years and served there for five.
We have here, as is clear from the outset, another very lengthy treatment (like Karnow's, like Sheehan's) purporting to
be about the war as a whole, but in reality focused disproportionately on the early years of the American buildup and
concentration on a war of attrition. This time we get over 660 pages of discussion, 80 percent of it dealing with matters
through 1968, only 20 percent with the remaining seven years of the war.
Within this unbalanced overall treatment are reinforcing instances of selective emphasis reflecting the pervasive bias.
The massacre of some 500 people perpetrated by US troops at My Lai, for example, is recounted at length--12 pages
overall at three points in the text, plus a photograph--while the preplanned and deliberate communist massacre of
thousands of civilians at Hue during the 1968 Tet Offensive merits one page, including an exculpatory assertion that
"the savagery was due in part to conflicting orders out of Hanoi."
Such skewed coverage permits the author to make the familiar claims of inept conduct of the war by American political
and military leadership, poor performance by South Vietnamese governmental and military leaders, and substantial
success by the enemy. It seems likely that Langguth acquired these outlooks during early service as The New York
Times Saigon bureau chief in 1965 and, despite subsequent stints in 1968 and 1970, never reexamined them. Only by
ignoring the realities of the latter years, when wiser and more able allied leaders produced a better outcome, can such a
version of events gain even superficial credibility.
In May 1968, when General Creighton Abrams was in the process of taking command of US forces in Vietnam,
Langguth wrote a long profile for The New York Times Magazine. "With Abrams," he asserted, "it was bound to be
more of the same." Instead, Abrams changed virtually every aspect of the war, from the concept of its nature to
strategy, tactics, and measures of merit. Stressing population security as the key element, Abrams stated explicitly his
conviction that the "body count," viewed as the key determinant of progress by his predecessor, General William C.
Westmoreland, was essentially irrelevant. "I don't think it makes any difference how many losses he [the enemy]

takes," Abrams told his commanders in a total repudiation of the earlier approach. "I don't think that makes any
difference." Yet in the ensuing decades Langguth has apparently still not confronted the evidence amassed against his
earlier judgment.
A major flaw in scholarship is that the text lacks endnote references, forcing the reader who wonders about the basis or
source for a given assertion to sift through the page number references at the back of the book on the chance that there
might be one relating to the matter in question. This technique is not only frustrating and time-consuming, but also
results in significantly less author accountability than the standard practice. And often Langguth makes an assertion
concerning a matter of which he could not have personal knowledge without providing any source. These lapses
cannot, a quarter century after the end of the war, be passed off as inevitable attributes of the "first draft of history"
journalists are fond of citing.
On other matters, Langguth simply does not know what he is talking about. He refers to General Westmoreland's "rare
press interviews," when Westmoreland assiduously courted the press at every opportunity, even preempting the
residence of a university president to give an impromptu press conference while he was back in the United States to
attend a college football game. Langguth claims that when the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to Vietnam it was forced
to leave half its trained troops behind due to the impending expiration of their terms of enlistment. The correct figure is
more like 20 percent. And he characterizes South Vietnamese General Ngo Quang Truong as "honest but inept." Every
American who knew him, from General Abrams on down, considered Truong to be South Vietnam's ablest combat
leader, a superb man in every respect.
As the war reaches its grim conclusion in this account, Langguth seems to share the exultation of the victorious North
Vietnamese. While initially one might have anticipated that the "our" in the title of "Our Vietnam" would signify
America's war in Vietnam, it turns out to denote the war as viewed by those who did, and still do, oppose it.
Thus to the war's aftermath, including the conquerors' murderous "reeducation" camps and the tens of thousands of
boat people fleeing their homeland in a desperate search for freedom, the author devotes three lines.
As coda, Langguth takes for his own, inscribed without quotation marks as the final words of his account, a
communist functionary's summation of the war and its outcome: "North Vietnam's leaders had deserved to win. South
Vietnam's leaders had deserved to lose. And America's leaders, for thirty years, had failed the people of the North, the
people of the South, and the people of the United States."
Readers interested in the real story of this war and its consequences might instead consider the words of former Viet
Cong Colonel Pham Xuan An: "All that talk about `liberation' twenty, thirty, forty years ago, all the plotting, and all
the bodies, produced this, this impoverished, broken-down country led by a gang of cruel and paternalistic halfeducated theorists."
Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher. By Malham M. Wakin. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books,
2000. 192 pages. $60.00. Reviewed by Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Staff Judge Advocate, Air Education
and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.
Ethics is something the military talks about a lot. Leaders frequently importune their charges with lectures about
integrity, honor, courage, and other classic virtues of military culture, if not society at large. But too often such
discourse is without context, and it rarely benefits from a thorough understanding of the intellectual roots of the
philosophical concepts that underlay ethical thinking and practice.
The absence of such intellectual infrastructure haunts attempts by war colleges and other military forums to have indepth discussions of the ethical dilemmas today's military leaders are likely to face. Without cognizance of the
"wheres" and "whys" of the ethical tradition, such efforts often founder. Too often they devolve into superficial
analyses where the end justifies the means and situational ethics reign supreme. Unequipped to see the errors of their
logic, officers can leave with a distorted view of their responsibilities.
Solving this dilemma is not easy, as the basic material can be dense and formidable reading. Secondary sources may

not be sufficiently focused on the military environment, or are themselves still too opaque for the busy nonspecialists.
A careful reading of retired Brigadier General Malham M. Wakin's collection of essays, Integrity First: Reflections of
a Military Philosopher, would help fill the void. I say "careful" because most readers will want to skip the extraneous
and largely irrelevant diversions into the bureaucracy of teaching, especially at the Air Force Academy where Wakin
taught for decades after seeing combat as an aviator in Vietnam.
Regrettably, the short book does evoke a sense of being a boutique volume intended mainly as a tribute to the author
and souvenir for his inner group of admirers. Indeed, a disciplined editor might have turned a good and valuable book
into a great and invaluable one. Given that the collection's essays were written over nearly 40 years of contentious
military policies and political events, cutting superfluous material in favor of added background information would
have enhanced its worth.
Still, there is much to commend the work. Its relative brevity and lucid prose invite those deterred by the weighty and
nearly impenetrable tomes that seem to dominate the field. Wakin's chapter "On the Nature of Man" is a real gem. It is
an exquisite tour de force that ranges over thousands of years of philosophical thinking. It very clearly displays the
genius of a veteran professor obviously skilled in making the inscrutable scrutable to generations of Air Force
Academy cadets. Likewise, in the chapter entitled "Egoism as a Moral Theory," Wakin demonstrates an uncanny talent
for concisely explaining the ever-popular "objectivist" thinking of Ayn Rand, a feat that has defeated a legion of other
writers, not to mention Rand herself.
That said, a psychological archeologist might find it interesting to chart Wakin's presentations in light of Air Force
doctrinal developments. In particular, it is noteworthy that airpower advocates, including some who would have passed
through the academy during Wakin's tenure, have made statements in the aftermath of Allied Force's air operation
against the Serbs that seem surprisingly indifferent to many of the ethical issues he discusses. Reflecting on the air
strategy employed, a very senior officer espoused in an official publication the notion that had bombing cut off
electricity and water supplies to Serb civilians earlier, the military effort might have succeeded sooner.* Suffice to say,
destroying things indispensable to human survival, particularly in urban areas, for the sole purpose of imposing
hardship on noncombatants is an impermissible application of the long-rejected concept of Kriegsraison** and raises
significant legal and moral issues.
Perhaps the main weakness of the book from this reviewer's perspective is the failure to fulfill the promise of the title.
Specifically, too often it seems the text lacks an inculcation of the military perspective. The chapter on nuclear
weapons, for example, appears to take at face value the layman's view that any use of them is inherently catastrophic
and morally unthinkable.
Obviously, any use of these horrific weapons would be hugely tragic, and may well have unintended psychological
effects on the politics of the use of force. That is not, however, the same thing as saying the weapons could never have
a use that serves right purposes. For the military officer, a dispassionate evaluation that appreciates the range of the
weapons' technical capabilities in relation to classic philosophical themes would be immensely helpful. For example,
weighing the utility of employing a low-yield nuclear weapon against an enemy's biological weapons facility in order
to achieve the very high temperatures needed to destroy certain contagions is the kind of knotty moral and ethical issue
to which a technical understanding of military realities might usefully bring context.
Likewise, the book's discussion of the military uses of technology is disappointing. Admirably, the author admits that
many humanists critiquing the morality of scientific and engineering endeavors are themselves not literate in those
disciplines. But one would think that a philosophy professor at the Air Force Academy would not be among them. As
Carl Builder and others have noted, the Air Force is obsessed with science and engineering, ironically to the detriment
of its appreciation of the art of war itself. Much the same can be said about the service's moral and philosophical bent.
Wakin's brief discussion of the philosophical dimensions of technology does little to address this contention.
Nevertheless, the book does contain many hidden nuggets, and it still represents a highlight in an area of increasing
importance to the military professional. One hopes that a properly edited and economically priced paperback version
might someday become available. The hardback's price alone will scare off all but the most determined reader, and
virtually guarantees the book will never achieve the scale of readership the text deserves.

* The US commander of the NATO air forces during the Allied Force air operation, a 1965 Air Force Academy
graduate, was quoted as follows:
"As an airman, I would have targeted the power grid, bridges, and military headquarters in and around
Belgrade the first day of the conflict," said [the commander], who believes that's what eventually brought
Milosevic to his knees. "Air power is made for shock value."
"Just think if after the first day, the Serbian people had awakened and their refrigerators weren't running,
there was no water in their kitchens or bathrooms, no lights, no transportation system to get to work, and
five or six military headquarters in Belgrade had disappeared, they would have asked: `All this after the
first night? What is the rest of this [conflict] going to be like?'"
As quoted by Tim Barela in "To Win a War," Airman, September 1999, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added). These are
essentially the same points reported earlier by The Washington Post. See William Drozdiak, "Air War Commander
Says Kosovo Victory Near," The Washington Post, 24 May 1999, p. 1.
** Kriegsraison asserts that "military necessity could justify any measures--even in violation of the laws of war--when
the necessities of the situation purportedly justified it." See Air Force Pamphlet 110-3, International Law--The
Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (19 November 1976), para. 1-3a(1).
A Soldier's Duty. By Thomas E. Ricks. New York: Random House, 2001. 320 pages. $24.95. Reviewed by
Professor Martin L. Cook, Elihu Root Professor of Military Studies and Professor of Ethics, US Army War College.
Much has been said and written in recent years about the state of civil-military relations and subordination of the US
military to civilian leadership. Certainly the tension between the values of the officer corps and the civilian leadership
has, in recent years, been marked and great. Contributing significantly to that discussion was Thomas Ricks' earlier
nonfiction work, Making the Corps, and his many well-informed articles on military affairs in The Wall Street Journal
and, in more recent years, The Washington Post.
In this novel, the author takes full advantage of the liberties fiction allows to explore the attitudes of some Army
officers in particular on this subject. The novel's premise is that the President orders a deployment of ill-prepared
forces on a humanitarian mission against the weight of professional military advice. Email begins to fly from
untraceable addresses criticizing the deployment and, increasingly, advocating public expressions of dissent by
uniformed officers, culminating in direct action to sabotage the deployment itself.
A thoroughly engaging mystery story unfolds as investigations are undertaken to determine the source of the emails
and sabotage. The details of the plot would, of course, ruin the mystery for the reader. But the narrative vehicle gives
Mr. Ricks ample opportunity to introduce extensive dialog among his characters on questions of the nature and scope
of "a soldier's duty"--to the Constitution, to elected political leaders engaged in (from the military perspective) illadvised action, to military superiors and subordinates, and finally to the Army. The author claims that much of this
dialog is not his own creation, but plucked verbatim from emails he has received or had forwarded to him from serving
officers. Indeed, they have the ring of reality.
The novel is effective as fiction, but it aims at more than engaging pastime reading. Mr. Ricks' real purpose is to raise
pointedly the questions of ethical obligation and professionalism of an officer corps frustrated with taskings it often
questions, if not outright rejects. Without the defining threat of the Cold War, the author perceives a military separated
from and, to some degree, alienated from the American society it is pledged to serve. Mr. Ricks illustrates effectively
the human tensions of obedient service to civilian leaders whose judgment some officers distrust, when those leaders
send them on missions whose purposes are murky, in an atmosphere of casualty aversion and political management of
the military aspects of the deployment.
The author's portrayal of senior Army officers is in many respects unflattering and, in the case of one officer and his
subordinates, literally criminal. But he also shows good officers struggling with the ambiguities of strategic-level

leadership, trying to triangulate their way through the complex pressures of supporting administration policies which,
in private, they have opposed. He shows the challenges to their integrity in keeping their pledges to give their honest
personal opinions to Congress when required, and yet not appearing to lobby for policies opposed to the President's.
All of that, of course, is framed in light of their passion to protect and defend their service, and their pain in placing
soldiers on deployments where their worst fears come true and ill-trained troops take casualties on missions they
opposed in the first place.
A Soldier's Duty is bound to be a controversial and challenging read for any thoughtful military officer. One might
well dissent from the picture painted of the state of civil-military relations as too bleak, too polarized. But one would
have to look far for a novel that touches so deftly on the complexities and challenges of leadership of military
organizations at the highest levels. However one reacts to the choices of these particular characters, reflection on the
environment in which they strive to serve the nation, the Army, and their soldiers is a vitally important intellectual
exercise. I know of no other work of fiction that forces the complexity of those questions so clearly on the reader.
Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War. By Mark J. Osiel. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1999. 398 pages. $39.95. Reviewed by Dr. Shannon E. French, professor of ethics in the
Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law at the US Naval Academy.
International news reports since the beginning of the year have recorded a steady stream of precedent-smashing events
in the area of war crimes prosecution. On New Year's Eve, then-President Clinton made the controversial decision to
authorize the United States to sign the Rome Treaty, which creates a permanent international criminal court for the
trial of war criminals. In February 2001, three Bosnian Serbs were convicted as war criminals by the UN's International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for raping and torturing Muslim women and girls during the
Bosnian War. It was the first time that the international community officially labeled rape, viewed as an "instrument of
terror," as a "crime against humanity." Clearly, there is a growing international consensus that certain acts are morally
reprehensible in any context, including the fog of war. In this setting, Mark Osiel's groundbreaking critical analysis of
the problem of motivating ethical behavior among combat troops, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and
the Law of War, is urgently relevant.
Osiel, a law professor at the University of Iowa, has wrestled with the complex subject of the conduct of war for many
years. His research has gone beyond traditional academic and legal scholarship to include firsthand interviews with
war criminals and their victims. Obeying Orders follows on the heels of several related journal articles and a 1997
volume entitled Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law. This most recent work deserves the respect and
attention of applied ethicists, lawyers, military professionals, and policymakers alike.
The central thesis of Obeying Orders is found on page 23 of the text, where the author firmly states that "the best
prospects for minimizing war crimes (not just obvious atrocity) derive from creating a personal identity based on the
virtues of chivalry and martial honor, virtues seen by officers as constitutive of good soldiering." In other words, Osiel
asserts that the best way to ensure that a young Marine will not commit a war crime even if given (illegal) orders to do
so by a superior officer is not to drill the said Marine on the provisions of international law and the UCMJ, but rather
to help him internalize an appropriate warrior's code that will inspire him to recognize and reject the criminal
directions of his officer. Osiel notes that the statement, "Marines don't do that," is "surely a simpler, more effective way
of communicating the law of war than threatening prosecution for war crimes, by the enemy, an international tribunal,
or an American court-martial."
Osiel makes an extremely compelling case for this psychologically powerful code- and character-based approach to the
prevention of war crimes. He connects it to Aristotle's virtue ethics, which stresses the importance of positive
habituation and the development of certain critical virtues, such as courage, justice, benevolence, and honor, over the
rote memorization of specific rules of conduct. Simply staying within the bounds of a rulebook, as Osiel observes, can
often be less demanding than consistently upholding high standards of character and nobility:
The manifest illegality rule merely sets a floor, and a relatively low one at that: avoid the most obvious
war crimes, atrocities. It does not say, as does the internal ideal of martial honor: always cause the least

degree of lawful, collateral damage to civilians, consistent with your military objectives. By taking
seriously such internal conceptions of martial honor, we may be able to impose higher standards on
professional soldiers than the law has traditionally done, in the knowledge that good soldiers already
impose these standards upon themselves.
Osiel goes on to highlight the importance of the use of shaming tactics--especially so-called "reintegrative shaming,"
which aims to reform, not permanently ostracize, the offender--to motivate modern warriors' dedication to the ideals of
martial honor. He also defends the value of presenting persons entering the military culture with role models who
remained true to their codes of honor even in the face of overwhelming challenges or temptations. As further support
for his position, he points out that this approach of reinforcing desirable character traits among military professionals
in no way undermines a rule-following approach, but rather provides additional motivation to obey rules when they are
clear (so-called "bright-line rules") while giving much-needed guidance when the rules are not enough.
I find Osiel's arguments remarkably persuasive. Furthermore, I believe their strength and coherence is such that even
those who are less sympathetic to his views have an obligation to familiarize themselves with his contribution to the
debate. That said, I cannot conclude my review without adding one minor qualification to my otherwise hearty
recommendation of Obeying Orders. While the content of Osiel's book is excellent, some aspects of his writing style
are irritating. For one thing, he is given to excessive quotations. There are several passages in which it seems as
though every other line is from another source. At times I wanted to shout, "Can't you put anything in your own
words?" This occasionally becomes more than a style issue when Osiel commits the "appeal to authority" fallacy by
quoting the conclusions of others without presenting the arguments that support them or defending them himself. In
addition, some of his lengthier footnotes contain important assertions or clarifications that should have been integrated
into the main body of the work. Finally, on a more trivial note, I found Osiel's "politically correct" use of the female
pronoun throughout when referring to soldiers or officers jarring and contrived, given that women are still a minority
in the military profession. Alternating genders would have been preferable.
Beyond question, Obeying Orders is a highly valuable component of the current literature on the prevention of war
crimes. This is true not only because Osiel presents a well-considered and potentially fruitful method for motivating
moral conduct in war but also because he follows up his theoretical musings with practical advice on how to effect the
changes he suggests. After making his case for character-based training, Osiel illustrates exactly what he has in mind
by exploring better ways to understand and reshape the psychology of combat units, to find new, more effective roles
for military legal advisors, and to empower individual soldiers to avoid the commission of illegally ordered war
crimes, minor to atrocious. No one who is interested in reducing the horror of war can afford to ignore the hope that
Osiel's Obeying Orders offers.
MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader. Edited by William M. Leary. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2001. 538 pages. $40.00. Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Research Professor of Military
Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
Though I was always impressed with the high esteem verging on awe that my parents and their friends from the World
War II generation exhibited toward Douglas MacArthur, I didn't really understand the power of his legacy until I was
assigned to serve in South Korea in the late 1970s. I was commanding a trainload of soldiers and equipment heading
for Annual Service Practice that broke down in the middle of the night, and my interpreter and I appealed to a sleepy
local stationmaster for assistance. He seemed reluctant to help until he spotted my West Point class ring, and after a
burst of excited discussion he went out and woke up what seemed to be the whole population of the surrounding
village to repair our train. When I asked my interpreter what had happened, he explained that when the stationmaster
realized I had gone to the US Military Academy, he felt obligated to render all possible assistance because "General
MacArthur went to West Point, too."
As often happens in the United States, MacArthur has been the target of a considerable amount of critical revisionist
history since his death in 1964. In MacArthur and the American Century, William M. Leary has assembled a collection
of essays reassessing the general's legacy. The editor describes the volume as an introduction to MacArthur's career,
and it appears to be an attempt to consolidate a variety of post-revisionist evaluations of the most controversial events

in his extraordinary life. Purposeful connections to "the American Century" are tenuous at best, but the selections do
illuminate important aspects of World War II and Korea.
Though the book contains some of MacArthur's most eloquent speeches and two first-person recollections, the bulk of
the volume features commentaries by present-day historians. The best sections--on the campaign in the Southwest
Pacific, postwar occupation of Japan, and Korean War--include a number of contrasting interpretations of MacArthur's
performance that display the conflicting passions he still inspires. The essays on Korea are particularly good, including
entries by D. Clayton James, Barton Bernstein, and Edgar O'Ballance. Stephen Taafe, Edward Drea, and Clark
Reynolds present some provocative observations on World War II in the Pacific. Leary also includes useful
commentaries from an Australian and a Japanese historian concerning MacArthur's impact on their nations.
The rest of the volume is much more uneven. MacArthur's early years through his remarkable performance in World
War I are not covered, and the only discussion of his important contributions as Chief of Staff of the Army deals with
the Bonus March. Stephen Ambrose's rosy characterization of MacArthur's term as Superintendent at the Military
Academy needed a counterbalancing view. The "Assessments" chapter is especially disappointing. The editor's reliance
there on book reviews of MacArthur biographies can be questioned, and Laura Belmonte's peculiar article on gender
and the culture of militarism misrepresents some facts and seems very much out of place. What this volume lacks most
is some sense of the awe MacArthur inspired in Americans of his own generation, like my parents. Leary's work would
have benefited from the addition of more contemporary accounts.
For readers wanting an introduction to Douglas MacArthur's fascinating career, I recommend Geoffrey Perret's Old
Soldiers Never Die. For those with more time and wanting a more thorough evaluation, D. Clayton James's
multivolume biography cannot be surpassed. Leary's book serves better as a supplement to these other works.
Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam. By Kenneth Conboy and Dale
Andradé. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 347 pages. $34.95. Reviewed by Dr. Henry G. Gole (Colonel,
USA Ret.), who served with MACSOG in Vietnam.
Conboy and Andradé, both of whom have written other books dealing with covert operations in Vietnam, provide us a
thoroughly researched and comprehensive account of America's failed clandestine war in North Vietnam. The book is
grounded in previously untapped sources, whose full exploitation promises to reveal other aspects of that war. Finding
truth in covert operations is difficult due to the nature of operations replete with deception and cover stories designed
to mislead. Failed operations provide yet another reason to hide the father of the bastard child. Therefore, the authors'
"Note on Sources" is especially useful to the reader.
The Pentagon Papers, leaked in 1971, exposed a covert program in North Vietnam from 1954, a secret war deemed
appropriate before US combat troops were committed openly. In 1992, the "Military Assistance Command Studies and
Operations Group (MACSOG) Documentation Study," written in 1970, came to light. It provided evidence for what
previously had been speculation and rumor, and, because it named names, led to interviews with participants. This
source was cross-referenced with classified special operations annexes to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV) command histories to get the details of specific missions into North Vietnam. Then, in late 1995, archivists at
the National Archives discovered 80 boxes of SOG financial records, allowing researchers to follow the money trail.
Moreover, since 1984 Hanoi has permitted the publication of accounts of countermeasures taken against agents from
the South, thus adding insights from "the other side of the hill." Diligence in mining sources and the backgrounds of
our authors have produced an authoritative and convincing story.
It is a story of failure--failure in concept, preparation, and execution; in learning from experience; and in loyalty to the
indigenous people the United States used, deserted, and forgot. The story begins in 1952, describing the optimism and
naïveté of the five-year-old CIA, whose agents behaved like irresponsible cowboys. It points to the folly of
encouraging the post-1954 migration of Catholics from North to South Vietnam, thus removing a stay-behind potential
that would have facilitated the survival of agents inserted into North Vietnam. It characterizes incompetence in a world
in which "Terry and the Pirates" met Charlie Chaplin's feckless little hobo. It is a litany of defects.

The Saigon government was (and would remain) too busy with palace intrigue to heed events in the countryside.
American advisers failed to recognize the difference between inserting agents into World War II Europe, with
resistance to Hitler ready to support them, and putting agents into a land in the iron grip of Hanoi, where militia was
present in almost every village. Repeated use of the same insertion techniques by air and sea between 1961 and 1967
resulted in 54 teams (some 500 men) being killed or captured. SOG's own figures show almost complete failure from
1964 (when it took the mission from the CIA) to 1968. Indications that inserted teams had been turned by the enemy
were ignored. Non-Vietnamese speakers were given Vietnamese identification and cover stories. Missions were
clumsily conceived and blurred, failing to make distinctions between long-term intelligence gathering (requiring
patience and passivity) and sabotage, kidnapping, and ambushing missions (requiring shock, violence, and firepower,
thus revealing their presence). Background investigations of agents were crude and ineffective. Agents from different
programs mingled in training and recreation, making it easy for enemy spies to determine and report to Hanoi who was
doing what. The same safe houses were used for years. The US military in Vietnam negotiated with the American
Ambassador in Laos as though with a foreign power. Despite almost uninterrupted failure, Walt Rostow and Robert S.
McNamara considered Oplan 34A-64 "a well-reasoned plan of gradual escalation." Distance between thought and deed
was great.
Not until 1968 was it determined that North Vietnam was paranoid regarding threats to its total control. That is,
psychological operations, cheap in money and lives, caused counterproductive repressive measures by North Vietnam.
Ironically, just when enemy vulnerabilities and SOG capabilities were properly matched and SOG hit its stride,
President Johnson summoned General Abrams to Washington to tell him that bombing and other operations in North
Vietnam would be halted.
The authors conclude that the CIA and SOG operations in North Vietnam affected Hanoi's war only marginally. This
reviewer accepts that conclusion and commends the book to readers with three observations. First, the book is very
detailed, making it valuable to specialists in covert operations and to scholars, but perhaps a bit overwhelming to the
general reader. Second, your reviewer does not accept the charge of SOG ineptness in connection with operations in
Laos and Cambodia, but that is a topic for another book. Finally, as a professional soldier and proud American, your
reviewer feels unmitigated shame for the shoddy manner in which we used and discarded our brave and loyal foreign
"assets" after the war.
Leadership in Conflict: 1914-1918. Edited by Matthew Hughes and Matthew Seligmann. South Yorkshire,
Eng.: Leo Cooper, Pen & Sword Books, 2000. 291 pages. $45.00. Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II (LTC,
USA Ret.), a research professor with the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
Save your investment here; this book is not what it purports to be. Ask your library to order a copy for the shelves in
order to gain access to the extensive footnotes. If you choose to pick this book up, be prepared for a confusing array of
"leaders," as they run from former ambassadors turned arch-propagandists to a relatively obscure division commander,
a prominent doctor, two field marshals, and heads of state. The unifying thread, loosely woven, is the power of
personality in war, and the reader would best approach this by first reading the classic Die Macht der Persönlichkeit im
Kriege, written by Major General Baron Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven in 1905.
Thereafter, be prepared to skim this work for particular details as several of the chapters are in serious need of editing
for coherence. Beware of the conclusions in several chapters as they do not follow logically from the preceding
material. The reader is left with the impression that these papers were hurriedly prepared for a conference that
contained a promise to publish the compendium by a certain date that turned out to be too soon after the event. These
are faults that must be placed on the editors.
All that said, there is material in this book worth reading. The final chapter, "Kaiser Wilhelm: The Hohenzollerns at
War," is nicely done, but it should have been packaged with the other two German pieces on Moltke and Falkenhayn.
Contrariwise, the Falkenhayn piece, which in reality addresses staff intrigue more than personality, sets the stage for
what could have been a very interesting cross-cultural set on Easterners vs. Westerners in various armies. Another
theme deserving greater recognition is the function of personality in coalition operations. In fact, that theme should
have been obvious in several essays, particularly those on Foch, Pershing, Rawlinson, and, with some tweaking, Lloyd

George. The editors might well have concluded that in coalition operations, the function of personality in a senior
leader is superior to almost every other quality. When interviewed after our recent Gulf War, Lieutenant General
Calvin Waller, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Central Command, interrupted the interview process to say words to
exactly that effect. The Rawlinson piece makes this point admirably through the essay, except in the conclusion.
There are good authors in this book, and their research is extensive and well documented. However, the book leaves
much to be desired, and the reader will find it necessary to tread carefully amidst the jumble.
Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation. By Joseph J. Ellis. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.
288 pages. $26.00. Reviewed by Dr. Robert M. S. McDonald, assistant professor of history, US Military Academy.
Joseph J. Ellis's Pulitzer Prize-winning group portrait of the revolutionary generation renders the Founding Fathers not
as statuesque patriarchs but instead as a sometimes raucous fraternity of strong-willed statesmen competing and
collaborating to answer questions that the War for Independence posed but did not answer: When coinciding claims of
liberty, equality, and union come into conflict, which would prevail? Did the new republic derive its authority from
laws or men? Would sovereignty reside in the states, the national government, or, as the Constitution of 1787-88
somewhat imaginatively claimed, an "American" people who at the outset of the federal experiment did not really
exist? As Ellis's expert account makes clear, the founders proved themselves so adept at constructing alternative
responses that today these questions continue to resonate.
Ellis is selective in characterizing this generation, which he describes (notwithstanding recent claims by Tom Brokaw)
as the greatest in American history. He focuses on George Washington, whose willingness to not only embrace but
also relinquish power made him "an incalculable asset" to the revolutionary enterprise; John Adams, Washington's
fiercely independent, realistic, and self-sacrificing successor; Thomas Jefferson, the graceful willow of a man whose
lofty rhetoric reflected his soaring capacity for self-delusion; James Madison, the detail-oriented political scientist and
Jeffersonian tactician; and Benjamin Franklin, the venerable sage whose knack for timing placed him at the head of the
American abolitionist movement at the only moment it may have had a decent chance of peaceably succeeding.
Abigail Adams, the second President's wife and one-woman cabinet, plays a supporting role in Ellis's account. So do
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr who, in chapter one, illustrate through their famous 1804 duel the fact that a
concern for one's honor could cause a member of the founding cohort (enter Hamilton) to risk all against a craven
upstart (enter Burr) who called it into question.
The fatal encounter between Hamilton and Burr proved to be more of an exception than a rule, Ellis maintains.
Subsequent chapters focus on instances of compromise: Jefferson's 1790 dinner table diplomacy, which influenced
Hamilton to support Madison's plan to locate the permanent capital on the Potomac and Madison to drop his opposition
to Hamilton's debt financing scheme; Congress's 1790 agreement, after a particularly bruising debate over slavery, to
preclude future discussion of the issue; Washington's authorial collaboration with Madison and Hamilton, which
yielded his 1796 farewell address urging "unity at home and independence abroad"; Adams's troubled presidency,
which could have been defined by partnership with Jefferson but, after Jefferson spurned the olive branch and
embraced Madison's more partisan vision, ended up as a partnership between Adams and his protective, spitfire wife;
and the final rapprochement between Adams and Jefferson, who from 1812 to 1826 engaged in an elegiac
correspondence marked by posing for posterity and gentlemanly argument. Ellis's episodic treatment allows him to
focus on these key interludes, reach backward or forward in time to provide context, and construct an impressively
elegant study of sufficient breadth to encompass its penetrating interpretive depth.
His overarching interpretation--that the revolutionary generation's compromises and accommodations preserved the
shaky union but failed to resolve with any specificity the ends the union served--does not represent an indiscriminate
return to the 1950s "consensus" school of American historiography. But Ellis's emphasis on contingency, on the
"improvisational" nature of the period and the fact that "sheer chance, pure luck--both good and bad--and specific
decisions made in the crucible of specific military and political crises" determined outcomes does represent a departure
from the sometimes overly deterministic ideological interpretations that since the late 1960s have marked studies of the
new nation. While this scholarship informs Ellis's account, personality (together with personal choices and
relationships) trumps ideology as an agent of change.

As such, this engaging, persuasive book can be read as a leadership primer, an account of real individuals who made
real decisions yielding real consequences that shaped their world and continue, for better and worse, to influence ours.
Reviewed 16 August 2001. Please send comments or corrections to carl_Parameters@conus.army.mil

